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Genesis of Suicide Terrorism

Scott Atran

Contemporary suicide terrorists from the Middle East are publicly deemed crazed cowards bent on senseless destruction who thrive in poverty and ignorance. Recent research indicates they have no appreciable psychopathology and are as educated and economically well-off as surrounding populations. A first line of defense is to get the communities from which suicide attackers stem to stop the attacks by learning how to minimize the receptivity of mostly ordinary people to recruiting organizations.

According to the U.S. Department of State report *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001* (1), no single definition of terrorism is universally accepted; however, for purposes of statistical analysis and policy-making: “The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” Of course, one side’s “terrorists” may well be another side’s “freedom fighters” (Fig. 1). For example, in this definition’s sense, the Nazi occupiers of France rightly denounced the “subnational” and “clandestine” French Resistance fighters as terrorists. During the 1980s, the International Court of Justice used the U.S. Administration’s own definition of terrorism to call for an end to U.S. support for “terrorism” on the part of Nicaraguan Contras opposing peace talks.

For the U.S. Congress, “‘act of terrorism’ means an activity that—(A) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; and (B) appears to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.” (2). When suitable, the definition can be broadened to include states hostile to U.S. policy.

Apparently, two official definitions of terrorism have existed since the early 1980s: that used by the Department of State “for statistical and analytical purposes” and that used by Congress for criminal proceedings. Together, the definitions allow great flexibil-

ity in selective application of the concept of terrorism to fluctuating U.S. priorities. The special category of “State-sponsored terrorism” could be invoked to handle some issues (3), but the highly selective and politically tendentious use of the label terrorism would continue all the same. Indeed, there appears to be no principled distinction between “terror” as defined by the U.S. Congress and “counterinsurgency” as allowed in U.S. armed forces manuals (4).

Rather than attempt to produce a stipulative and all-encompassing definition of terrorism, this article restricts its focus to “suicide terrorism” characterized as follows: the targeted use of self-destructing humans against noncombatant—typically civilian—populations to effect political change. Although a suicide attack aims to physically destroy an initial target, its primary use is typically as a weapon of psychological warfare intended to affect a larger public audience. The primary target is not those actually killed or injured in the attack, but those made to witness it. The enemy’s own information media amplify the attack’s effects to the larger target population. Through indoctrination and training and under charismatic leaders, self-contained suicide cells canalize disparate religious or political sentiments of individuals into an emotionally bonded group of fictive kin who willfully commit to die spectacularly for one another and for what

is perceived as the common good of alleviating the community’s onerous political and social realities.

Recent History

Suicide attack is an ancient practice with a modern history (supporting online text). Its use by the Jewish sect of Zealots (*sicari*) in Roman-occupied Judea and by the Islamic Order of Assassins (*hashashin*) during the early Christian Crusades are legendary examples (5). The concept of “terror” as systematic use of violence to attain political ends was first codified by Maximilien Robespierre during the French Revolution. He deemed it an “emanation of virtue” that delivers “prompt, severe, and inflexible” justice, as “a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to our country’s most pressing needs.” (6). The Reign of Terror, during which the ruling Jacobin faction exterminated thousands of potential



Fig. 1. Chanting demonstrators in Pakistan-held Kashmir defending Osama bin Laden’s actions and ambitions as freedom-fighting (November 2001). [AP Photo/Roshan Mugal]

enemies, of whatever sex, age, or condition, lasted until Robespierre’s fall (July 1794). Similar justification for state-sponsored terror was common to 20th-century revolutions, as in Russia (Lenin), Cambodia (Pol Pot), and Iran (Khomeini).

Whether subnational (e.g., Russian anarchists) or state-supported (e.g., Japanese *kamikaze*), suicide attack as a weapon of terror is usually chosen by weaker parties against

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materially stronger foes when fighting methods of lesser cost seem unlikely to succeed. Choice is often voluntary, but typically under conditions of group pressure and charismatic leadership. Thus, the *kamikaze* (“divine wind”) first used in the battle of the Philippines (November 1944) were young, fairly well educated pilots who understood that pursuing conventional warfare would likely end in defeat. When collectively asked by Adm. Takijiro Onishi to volunteer for “special attack” (*tokkotai*) “transcending life and death,” all stepped forward, despite assurances that refusal would carry no shame or punishment. In the Battle of Okinawa (April 1945) some 2000 *kamikaze* rammed fully fueled fighter planes into more than 300 ships, killing 5000 Americans in the most costly naval battle in U.S. history. Because of such losses, there was support for using the atomic bomb to end World War II (7).

The first major contemporary suicide terrorist attack in the Middle East was the December 1981 destruction of the Iraqi embassy in Beirut (27 dead, over 100 wounded). Its precise authors are still unknown, although it is likely that Ayatollah Khomeini approved its use by parties sponsored by Iranian intelligence. With the assassination of pro-Israeli Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel in September 1982, suicide bombing became a strategic political weapon. Under the pro-Iranian Lebanese Party of God (Hezbollah), this strategy soon achieved geopolitical effect with the October 1983 truck-bomb killing of nearly 300 American and French servicemen. American and France abandoned the multinational force policing Lebanon. By 1985, these attacks arguably led Israel to cede most of the gains made during its 1982 invasion of Lebanon.

In Israel-Palestine, suicide terrorism began in 1993, with attacks by Hezbollah-trained members of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) aimed at derailing the Oslo Peace Accords (8). As early as 1988, however, PIJ founder Fathi Shiqaqi established guidelines for “exceptional” martyrdom operations involving human bombs. He followed Hezbollah in stressing that God extols martyrdom but abhors suicide: “Allah may cause to be known those who believe and may make some of you martyrs, and Allah may purify those who believe and may utterly destroy the disbelievers”; however, “no one can die except by Allah’s leave” (9, 10) (Fig. 2).

The recent radicalization and networking through Al-Qaida of militant Islamic groups from North Africa, Arabia, and Central and Southeast Asia stems from the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989). With financial backing from the United States, members of these various

groups were provided opportunities to pool and to unify doctrine, aims, training, equipment, and methods, including suicide attack. Through its multifaceted association with regional groups (by way of finance, personnel, and logistics), Al-Qaida aims to realize flexibly its



Fig. 2. Wreckage in Gaza after an Israeli attack that killed Salah Shehadeh, Hamas military commander. It features the green Hamas flag, and Arabic graffiti reads: “We are resisters, death in the way of Allah is the life.” [AP Photo/Adel Hana]

global ambition of destroying Western dominance through local initiatives to expel Western influences (11). According to *Jane’s Intelligence Review*: “All the suicide terrorist groups have support infrastructures in Europe and North America.” (12).

Calling the current wave of radical Islam “fundamentalism” (in the sense of “traditionalism”) is misleading, approaching an oxymoron (supporting online text). Present-day radicals, whether Shi’ite (Iran, Hezbollah) or Sunni (Taliban, Al-Qaida), are much closer in spirit and action to Europe’s post-Renaissance Counter-Reformation than to any traditional aspect of Moslem history. The idea of a ruling ecclesiastical authority, a state or national council of clergy, and a religious police devoted to physically rooting out heretics and blasphemers has its clearest historical model in the Holy Inquisition. The idea that religion must struggle to assert control over politics is radically new to Islam (13).

Dubious Public Perceptions

Recent treatments of Homeland Security research concentrate on how to spend billions to protect sensitive installations from attack (14, 15). But this last line of defense is probably easiest to breach because of the multitude of

vulnerable and likely targets (including discotheques, restaurants, and malls), the abundance of would-be attackers (needing little supervision once embarked on a mission), the relatively low costs of attack (hardware store ingredients, no escape needs), the difficulty of detection (little use of electronics), and the unlikelihood that attackers would divulge sensitive information (being unaware of connections beyond their operational cells). Exhortations to put duct tape on windows may assuage (or incite) fear, but will not prevent massive loss of life, and public realization of such paltry defense can undermine trust. Security agencies also attend to prior lines of defense, such as penetrating agent-handling networks of terrorist groups, with only intermittent success.

A first line of defense is to prevent people from becoming terrorists. Here, success appears doubtful should current government and media opinions about why people become human bombs translate into policy (see also supporting online text on contrary academic explanations).

Suicide terrorists often are labeled crazed cowards bent on senseless destruction who thrive in the midst of poverty and ignorance. The obvious course becomes to hunt down terrorists while simultaneously transforming their supporting cultural and economic environment from despair to hope. What research there is, however, indicates that suicide terrorists have no appreciable psychopathology and are at least as educated and economically well off as their surrounding populations.

Psychopathology: A Fundamental Attribution Error

U.S. President George W. Bush initially branded 9/11 hijackers “evil cowards.” For U.S. Senator John Warner, preemptive assaults on terrorists and those supporting terrorism are justified because: “Those who would commit suicide in their assaults on the free world are not rational and are not deterred by rational concepts” (16). In attempting to counter anti-Moslem sentiment, some

groups advised their members to respond that “terrorists are extremist maniacs who don’t represent Islam at all” (17).

Social psychologists have investigated the “fundamental attribution error,” a tendency for people to explain behavior in terms of individual personality traits, even when significant situational factors in the larger society are at work. U.S. government and media characterizations of Middle East suicide bombers as craven homicidal lunatics may suffer from a fundamental attribution error: No instances of religious or political suicide terrorism stem from lone actions of cowering or unstable bombers.

Psychologist Stanley Milgram found that ordinary Americans also readily obey destructive orders under the right circumstances (18). When told by a “teacher” to administer potentially life-threatening electric shocks to “learners” who fail to memorize word pairs, most comply. Even when subjects stressfully protest as victims plead and scream, use of extreme violence continues—not because of murderous tendencies but from a sense of obligation in situations of authority, no matter how trite. A legitimate hypothesis is that apparently extreme behaviors may be elicited and rendered commonplace by particular historical, political, social, and ideological contexts.

With suicide terrorism, the attributional problem is to understand why nonpathological individuals respond to novel situational factors in numbers sufficient for recruiting organizations to implement policies. In the Middle East, perceived contexts in which suicide bombers and supporters express themselves include a collective sense of historical injustice, political subservience, and social humiliation vis-à-vis global powers and allies, as well as countervailing religious hope (supporting online text on radical Islam’s historical novelty). Addressing such perceptions does not entail accepting them as simple reality; however, ignoring the causes of these perceptions risks misidentifying causes and solutions for suicide bombing.

There is also evidence that people tend to believe that their behavior speaks for itself, that they see the world objectively, and that only other people are biased and misconstrue events (19). Moreover, individuals tend to misperceive differences between group norms as more extreme than they really are. Resulting misunderstandings—encouraged by religious and ideological propaganda—lead antagonistic groups to interpret each other’s views of events, such as terrorism/freedom-fighting,

as wrong, radical, and/or irrational. Mutual demonization and warfare readily ensue. The problem is to stop this spiral from escalating in opposing camps (Fig. 3).

Poverty and Lack of Education Are Not Reliable Factors

Across our society, there is wide consensus that ridding society of poverty rids it of crime (20). According to President Bush, “We fight poverty because hope is the answer to terror. . . . We will challenge the poverty and hopelessness and lack of education and failed governments that too often allow conditions that terrorists can seize” (21). At a gathering of Nobel Peace Prize laureates, South Africa’s Desmond Tutu and South Korea’s Kim Dae Jong opined, “at the bottom of terrorism is poverty”; Elie Wiesel and the Dalai Lama concluded, “education is the way to eliminate terrorism” (22).

Support for this comes from research pioneered by economist Gary Becker showing that property crimes are predicted by poverty and lack of education (23). In his incentive-based model, criminals are rational individuals acting on self-interest. Individuals choose illegal activity if rewards exceed probability of detection and incarceration together with expected loss of income from legal activity (“opportunity costs”). Insofar as criminals lack skill and education, as in much blue-collar crime, opportunity costs may be minimal; so crime pays.

Such rational-choice theories based on economic opportunities do not reliably account for some types of violent crimes (domestic homicide, hate killings). These calculations make even less sense for suicide terrorism. Suicide terrorists generally are not lacking in legitimate life opportunities relative to their general population. As the Arab press emphasizes, if martyrs had nothing to lose, sacrifice would be senseless (24): “He who commits suicide kills himself for his own benefit, he who commits martyrdom sacrifices himself for the sake of his religion and his nation. . . . The Mujahed is full of hope” (25).

Research by Krueger and Maleckova suggests that education may be uncorrelated, or even positively correlated, with supporting terrorism (26). In a December 2001 poll of 1357 West Bank and Gaza Palestinians 18 years of age or older, those having 12 or more years of schooling supported armed attacks by 68 points, those with up to 11 years of schooling by 63 points, and illiterates by 46 points. Only 40% of persons with advanced degrees supported dialogue with Israel versus 53% with college degrees and 60% with 9 years or less of schooling. In a comparison of Hezbollah militants who died in action with a random sample of Lebanese from the same age group and region, militants were less likely to come from poor



Fig. 3. Demonization works both ways. (A) Demonstrator’s placard outside the Palestinian embassy in Beijing vilifying the United Nations and the United States (April 2002). [Reuters/Andrew Wong] (B) Anti-Moslem sign outside Jacksonville, Florida, church (January 2003). [Photo courtesy of Florida Times-Union]

homes and more likely to have had secondary-school education.

Nevertheless, relative loss of economic or social advantage by educated persons might encourage support for terrorism. In the period leading to the first Intifada (1982–1988), the number of Palestinian men with 12 years or more of schooling more than doubled; those with less schooling increased only 30%. This coincided with a sharp increase in unemployment for college graduates relative to high school graduates. Real daily wages of college graduates fell some 30%; wages for those with only secondary schooling held steady. Underemployment also seems to be a factor among those recruited to Al-Qaida and its allies from the Arabian peninsula (27).

The Institutional Factor: Organizing Fictive Kin

Although humiliation and despair may help account for susceptibility to martyrdom in some situations, this is neither a complete explanation nor one applicable to other circumstances. Studies by psychologist Ariel Merari point to the importance of institutions in suicide terrorism (28). His team interviewed 32 of 34 bomber families in Palestine/Israel (before 1998), surviving attackers, and captured recruiters. Suicide terrorists apparently span their population's normal distribution in terms of education, socioeconomic status, and personality type (introvert vs. extrovert). Mean age for bombers was early twenties. Almost all were unmarried and expressed religious belief before recruitment (but no more than did the general population).

Except for being young, unattached males, suicide bombers differ from members of violent racist organizations with whom they are often compared (29). Overall, suicide terrorists exhibit no socially dysfunctional attributes (fatherless, friendless, or jobless) or suicidal symptoms. They do not vent fear of enemies or express "hopelessness" or a sense of "nothing to lose" for lack of life alternatives that would be consistent with economic rationality. Merari attributes primary responsibility for attacks to recruiting organizations, which enlist prospective candidates from this youthful and relatively unattached population. Charismatic trainers then intensely cultivate mutual commitment to die within small cells of three to six members. The final step before a martyrdom operation is a formal social contract, usually in the form of a video testament.

From 1996 to 1999 Nasra Hassan, a Pakistani relief worker, interviewed nearly 250 Palestinian recruiters and trainers, failed suicide bombers, and relatives of deceased bombers. Bombers were men aged 18 to 38: "None were uneducated, desperately poor,

simple-minded, or depressed. . . . They all seemed to be entirely normal members of their families" (30). Yet "all were deeply religious," believing their actions "sanctioned by the divinely revealed religion of Islam." Leaders of sponsoring organizations complained, "Our biggest problem is the hordes of young men who beat on our doors."

Psychologist Brian Barber surveyed 900 Moslem adolescents during Gaza's first Intifada (1987–1993) (31). Results show high levels of participation in and victimization from violence. For males, 81% reported throwing stones, 66% suffered physical assault, and 63% were shot at (versus 51, 38, and 20% for females). Involvement in violence was not strongly correlated with depression or antisocial behavior. Adolescents most involved displayed strong individual pride and social cohesion. This was reflected in activities: for males, 87% delivered supplies to activists, 83% visited martyred families, and 71% tended the wounded (57, 46, and 37% for females). A follow-up during the second Intifada (2000–2002) indicates that those still unmarried act in ways considered personally more dangerous but socially more meaningful. Increasingly, many view martyr acts as most meaningful. By summer 2002, 70 to 80% of Palestinians endorsed martyr operations (32).

Previously, recruiters scouted mosques, schools, and refugee camps for candidates deemed susceptible to intense religious indoctrination and logistical training. During the second Intifada, there has been a surfeit of volunteers and increasing involvement of secular organizations (allowing women). The frequency and violence of suicide attacks have escalated (more bombings since February 2002 than during 1993–2000); planning has been less painstaking. Despite these changes, there is little to indicate overall change in bomber profiles (mostly unmarried, average socioeconomic status, moderately religious) (28, 30).

In contrast to Palestinians, surveys with a control group of Bosnian Moslem adolescents from the same time period reveal markedly weaker expressions of self-esteem, hope for the future, and prosocial behavior (30). A key difference is that Palestinians routinely invoke religion to invest personal trauma with proactive social meaning that takes injury as a badge of honor. Bosnian Moslems typically report not considering religious affiliation a significant part of personal or collective identity until seemingly arbitrary violence forced awareness upon them.

Thus, a critical factor determining suicide terrorism behavior is arguably loyalty to intimate cohorts of peers, which recruiting organizations often promote through religious communion (supporting online text on reli-

gion's role) (33). Consider data on 39 recruits to *Harkat al-Ansar*, a Pakistani-based ally of Al-Qaida. All were unmarried males, most had studied the *Quran*. All believed that by sacrificing themselves they would help secure the future of their "family" of fictive kin: "Each [martyr] has a special place—among them are brothers, just as there are sons and those even more dear" (34). A Singapore Parliamentary report on 31 captured operatives from *Jemaah Islamiyah* and other Al-Qaida allies in Southeast Asia underscores the pattern: "These men were not ignorant, destitute or disenfranchised. All 31 had received secular education. . . . Like many of their counterparts in militant Islamic organizations in the region, they held normal, respectable jobs. . . . As a group, most of the detainees regarded religion as their most important personal value. . . . secrecy over the true knowledge of *jihād*, helped create a sense of sharing and empowerment vis-à-vis others." (35).

Such sentiments characterize institutional manipulation of emotionally driven commitments that may have emerged under natural selection's influence to refine or override short-term rational calculations that would otherwise preclude achieving goals against long odds. Most typically, such emotionally driven commitments serve as survival mechanisms to inspire action in otherwise paralyzing circumstances, as when a weaker person convincingly menaces a stronger person into thinking twice before attempting to take advantage. In religiously inspired suicide terrorism, however, these emotions are purposely manipulated by organizational leaders, recruiters, and trainers to benefit the organization rather than the individual (supporting online text on religion) (36).

Rational Choice Is the Sponsor's Prerogative, Not the Agent's

Little tangible benefit (in terms of rational-choice theories) accrues to the suicide bomber, certainly not enough to make the likely gain one of maximized "expected utility." Heightened social recognition occurs only after death, obviating personal material benefit. But for leaders who almost never consider killing themselves (despite declarations of readiness to die), material benefits more likely outweigh losses in martyrdom operations. Hassan cites one Palestinian official's prescription for a successful mission: "a willing young man. . . . nails, gunpowder, a light switch and a short cable, mercury (readily obtainable from thermometers), acetone. . . . The most expensive item is transportation to an Israeli town" (30). The total cost is about \$150.

For the sponsoring organization, suicide bombers are expendable assets whose losses generate more assets by expanding public

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support and pools of potential recruits. Shortly after 9/11, an intelligence survey of educated Saudis (ages 25 to 41) concluded that 95% supported Al-Qaida (37). In a December 2002 Pew Research Center survey on growing anti-Americanism, only 6% of Egyptians viewed America and its "War on Terror" favorably (38). Money flows from those willing to let others die, easily offsetting operational costs (training, supporting personnel, safe houses, explosives and other arms, trans-

searches cannot be very effective against people willing to die, although this may provide some semblance of security and hence psychological defense against suicide terrorism's psychological warfare. A middle line of defense, penetrating and destroying recruiting organizations and isolating their leaders, may be successful in the near term, but even more resistant organizations could emerge instead. The first line of defense is to drastically reduce receptivity of potential recruits to recruiting organizations. But how?

It is important to know what probably will not work. Raising literacy rates may have no effect and could be counterproductive should greater literacy translate into greater exposure to terrorist propaganda (in Pakistan, literacy and dislike for the United States increased as the number of religious *madrasa* schools increased from 3000 to 39,000 since 1978) (27, 38). Lessening poverty may have no effect, and could be counterproductive if poverty reduction for

the entire population amounted to a downward redistribution of wealth that left those initially better off with fewer opportunities than before. Ending occupation or reducing perceived humiliation may help, but not if the population believes this to be a victory inspired by terror (e.g., Israel's apparently forced withdrawal from Lebanon).

If suicide-bombing is crucially (though not exclusively) an institution-level phenomenon, it may require finding the right mix of pressure and inducements to get the communities themselves to abandon support for institutions that recruit suicide attackers. One way is to so damage the community's social and political fabric that any support by the local population or authorities for sponsors of suicide attacks collapses, as happened regarding the kamikaze as a by-product of the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the present world, however, such a strategy would neither be morally justifiable nor practical to implement, given the dispersed and distributed organization of terrorist institutions among distantly separated populations that collectively number in the hundreds of millions. Likewise, retaliation in kind ("tit-for-tat") is not morally acceptable if allies are sought (41). Even in more localized settings, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, coercive policies alone may

not achieve lasting relief from attack and can exacerbate the problem over time. On the inducement side, social psychology research indicates that people who identify with antagonistic groups use conflicting information from the other group to reinforce antagonism (19). Thus, simply trying to persuade others from without by bombarding them with more self-serving information may only increase hostility.

Other research suggests that most people have more moderate views than what they consider their group norm to be. Inciting and empowering moderates from within to confront inadequacies and inconsistencies in their own knowledge (of others as evil), values (respect for life), and behavior (support for killing), and other members of their group (42), can produce emotional dissatisfaction leading to lasting change and influence on the part of these individuals (43). Funding for civic education and debate may help, also interfaith confidence-building through intercommunity interaction initiatives (as Singapore's government proposes) (35). Ethnic profiling, isolation, and preemptive attack on potential (but not yet actual) supporters of terrorism probably will not help. Another strategy is for the United States and its allies to change behavior by directly addressing and lessening sentiments of grievance and humiliation, especially in Palestine (where images of daily violence have made it the global focus of Moslem attention) (44) (Fig. 4). For no evidence (historical or otherwise) indicates that support for suicide terrorism will evaporate without complicity in achieving at least some fundamental goals that suicide bombers and supporting communities share.

Of course, this does not mean negotiating over all goals, such as Al-Qaida's quest to replace the Western-inspired system of nation-states with a global caliphate, first in Moslem lands and then everywhere (see supporting online text for history and agenda of suicide-sponsoring groups). Unlike other groups, Al-Qaida publicizes no specific demands after martyr actions. As with an avenging army, it seeks no compromise. But most people who currently sympathize with it might.

Perhaps to stop the bombing we need research to understand which configurations of psychological and cultural relationships are lurking and binding thousands, possibly millions, of mostly ordinary people into the terrorist organization's martyr-making web. Study is needed on how terrorist institutions form and on similarities and differences across organizational structures, recruiting practices, and populations recruited. Are there reliable differences between religious and secular groups, or between ideologically driven and grievance-driven terrorism? Interviews with surviving Hamas bombers and captured Al-Qaida operatives suggest that ideology and grievance are factors for



Fig. 4. Moslem youth with *Quran* dressed as a Palestinian suicide bomber demonstrating outside the United Nations office in Jakarta, Indonesia (April 2002). (Indonesia is the most populous Moslem nation.) [Reuters/Darren Whiteside]

portation, and communication). After a Jerusalem supermarket bombing by an 18-year-old Palestinian female, a Saudi telethon raised more than \$100 million for "the Al-Quds Intifada."

Massive retaliation further increases people's sense of victimization and readiness to behave according to organizational doctrines and policies structured to take advantage of such feelings. In a poll of 1179 West Bank and Gaza Palestinians in spring 2002, 66% said army operations increased their backing for suicide bombings (39). By year's end, 73% of Lebanese Moslems considered suicide bombings justifiable (38). This radicalization of opinion increases both demand and supply for martyrdom operations. A December 2002 UN report credited volunteers with swelling a reviving Al-Qaida in 40 countries (40). The organization's influence in the larger society—most significantly its directing elites—increases in turn.

Priorities for Homeland Security

The last line of defense against suicide terrorism—preventing bombers from reaching targets—may be the most expensive and least likely to succeed. Random bag or body

both groups but relative weights and consequences may differ.

We also need to investigate any significant causal relations between our society's policies and actions and those of terrorist organizations and supporters. We may find that the global economic, political, and cultural agenda of our own society has a catalyzing role in moves to retreat from our world view (Taliban) or to create a global counterweight (Al-Qaida). Funding such research may be difficult. As with the somewhat tendentious and self-serving use of "terror" as a policy concept (45), to reduce dissonance our governments and media may wish to ignore these relations as legitimate topics for inquiry into what terrorism is all about and why it exists.

This call for research may demand more patience than any administration could politically tolerate during times of crisis. In the long run, however, our society can ill afford to ignore either the consequences of its own actions or the causes behind the actions of others. Potential costs of such ignorance are terrible to contemplate. The comparatively minor expense of research into such consequences and causes could have inestimable benefit.

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- U.S. Code Congress. Admin. News, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, v. 2, par. 3077, 98 STAT. (19 October 1984).
- Until 1983, official U.S. positions on "terror" followed the term's common meaning in use since the French Revolution, referring to state-sponsored terror. For example, under "sources relating to Operation Enduring Freedom and the struggle against terrorism," the U.S. Navy's Web guide on terrorism regularly links to Department of Defense articles on Iraq (www.history.navy.mil/library/guides/terrorism.htm).
- The recent Guatemalan truth commission report singled out the U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA), now at Fort Benning, Georgia, for counterinsurgency training that "had a significant bearing on human rights violations during the armed conflict." A 1998 human rights report released by the Guatemala Archdiocese Human Rights Office also linked SOA graduates in Guatemala's military intelligence (D-2, G-2) to a civilian-targeted campaign of kidnappings, torture, and murder that left tens of thousands dead. References available online through *Network Solidarity with the People of Guatemala* (NISGUA), "U.S. Army School of the Americas cited in Guatemalan Truth Commission Report," 17 July 2001; available at www.nisgua.org/articles/school_of_the_americas.htm.
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- Unlike people willing to blow themselves up, for frontline soldiers in an apparently hopeless battle, there usually remains hope for survival [G. Allport, J. Gillespie, J. Young, *J. Psychol.* **25**, 3 (1948)]. The distance between no hope and some (however small) is infinite, which represents the ultimate measure of devotion that religions typically uphold as ideal. While commitment to die for nonkin cannot be rendered within standard theories of Expected Utility, there are moves theorists attempt, such as invoking "infinite utility." Using "infinite utility" to patch theories of rationality creates holes elsewhere in the system. Thus, expected utilities are usually weighted averages, which has scant sense when one term is infinite. The deeper point is that notions of maximization of anticipated benefits cannot account for such behaviors, and ad hoc moves to maintain rational utility at all costs result in a concept of rationality or utility doing little explanatory work. In sum, reliance on rational-choice theories may not be the best way to understand and try to stop suicide terrorism.
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- "White Paper—The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests," (Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore, 9 January 2003); available at www2.mha.gov.sg. Recruitment and indoctrination into *Jemaah Islamiyah* are similar in other radical Islamic groups: "The first stage... involved religious classes organized for a general mass... The second stage... involved identifying those who were captivated enough to find out more about the plight of Muslims in other regions. [J] spiritual leader] Ibrahim Maidan identified potential members from those who were curious enough to remain after classes to enquire further. He engaged those students' interest and compassion and finally invited those he deemed suitable to join JI. This recruitment process would usually take about 18 months. The few who were selected as members were made to feel a strong sense of exclusivity and self esteem... a strong sense of in-group superiority."
- In much the same way, the pornography, fast food, or soft drink industries manipulate innate desires for naturally scarce commodities like sexual mates, fatty foods, and sugar to ends that reduce personal fitness but benefit the manipulating institution. [S. Atran, *In Gods We Trust* (Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 2002)].
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- One possibility is to offer and guarantee a clear resolution of "final status" acceptable to majorities of Israelis and Palestinians. Without clear resolution of final status before implementation of "confidence building" measures, with an understanding by all parties of what to expect in the end, it is likely that doubts about ultimate intentions will undermine any interim accord—as in every case since 1948. [S. Atran, *Politics and Society* **18**, 481 (1990)].
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Supporting Online Material

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Historical Developments. According to Marco Polo, the Assassins, who belonged to the schismatic sect of Nizārī Ismāʿīlites, would drug themselves into a religious fervor to get a foretaste of eternal bliss before setting out to kill or conquer (*S1*). But no corroborating evidence from Middle Eastern sources exists for such hashish rituals. From the fortress of Masyāf in the An-Nusayrīyah mountains, Rashīd ad-Dīn as-Sinān and his successors, known as *Shaykh al-djebel* (which the Crusaders rendered as “Old Man of the Mountain”), instituted a strategy of political wreckage and intimidation to undermine Sunni dominance in the region. Charismatic leaders ceremoniously passed on the ritual dagger to young men for use in suicide assassination. Victims included caliphs, sultans, emirs, vizirs, qadis (judges), and so on.

There are historical parallels with today’s Islamic radicals in terms of top-down organizational planning and discipline, and a millenarian belief in creation of a just religious society by means of sacrificial violence. Although the Assassins did not refrain from attacking Europeans, coreligionists were their primary victims. The anti-Western tenor of current radical Islamists echoes more the liberation ideology of *juramentado* (Spanish for “having sworn an oath”), which involved suicide attacks by small, diffusely organized groups of Philippine Moslems against colonizing Spaniards and other Christians (16th to 20th centuries) (*S2*).

The first use of terror as a political concept during the French Revolution was primarily the inspiration of lawyers, mid-level civil servants, and other educated professionals. Intellectuals among later-day violent revolutionaries (nihilists, bolsheviks, facists, and ethnic or religious supremacists) have also been the chief proponents of terror to disorient, demoralize, and destroy the enemy. They also occasionally resorted to using suicide attackers when circumstances permitted. Nothing indicates that the attackers themselves were ignorant or impoverished (e.g., Russian anarchist bombers, Japanese *kamikaze*).

Between 1983 and 1999, there were some 50 suicide attacks in Lebanon, about half of which were attributed to the Moslem Shi’ite organizations, Hezbollah and Amal. The other half was the work of secular nationalist parties (Syrian Nationalist Party, Lebanese Communist Party, Lebanese Ba’ath Party), who soon recognized the effectiveness of Hezbollah’s pioneering tactics. After the Israeli Air Force killed Hezbollah secretary general Abas Musavi in February 1992, Hezbollah went “international” a month later with a suicide attack against the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires (29 killed, 250 wounded). Nevertheless, having obtained its key political objectives in Lebanon, Hezbollah had dramatically lessened its strategic reliance on suicide bombing by 1992, when it decided to participate in parliamentary elections and become a “mainstream” political party. Lebanon’s other martyrdom-sponsoring organizations joined suit.

Hezbollah’s tactics also inspired Valupillai Prabhakaran, the charismatic leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), to form a cadre of suicide bombers (the Black Tigers) who do not “kill themselves” (*thatkolai*) but rather “give themselves” (*thatkodai*) to him and the cause (*S3*). Since 1983, the LTTE has spearheaded the Tamil insurgency against Sri Lanka’s government. The LTTE’s aim is both to eliminate the ruling elite of

Sri Lanka and to terrify the majority Sinhalese population into abandoning the government. Between 1987 and 2000, the Black Tigers carried out 168 attacks in Sri Lanka and India (about half of the world's suicide actions). Its victims include two Sri Lankan Presidents (one killed, one blinded), a Minister of Defense, a Navy Chief, assassinated Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, and a host of moderate Tamil leaders.

The LTTE's innovations include frequent use of female bombers and occasionally children (less likely than adult males to be searched), teams of multiple attackers (equipped with cyanide capsules to ensure no surviving sources of information), boat attacks (and a special squad of Sea Tigers), specialized body suits, an explosives research unit (testing for maximum damage at minimal cost and likelihood of detection), and a far-ranging international propaganda and procurement network. As with other successful martyr-sponsoring groups, there are apparently many more applicants than jobs, which allows better selection of candidates for martyrdom. The LTTE has successfully wrested control of Sri Lanka's northern and eastern coastal areas, where it has recently suspended suicide actions and allowed in visitors.

Hamas and PIJ initially focused suicide attacks on military installations in the occupied territories but soon shifted to Israel's cities and crowded areas to undermine civilian support for the Israeli government's occupation of Palestinian territories (Hamas and PIJ are publicly ambiguous about whether "Zionist occupation" refers to all of historic Palestine, including Israel itself, or only the West Bank and Gaza) (S4). Although there have been lulls in suicide actions, targeted assassinations of Hamas and PIJ organizers by Israeli intelligence even during lulls stimulated renewed attacks (e.g., after the January 1996 assassination of master bomber Yahya Ayyash). Recently, a radical wing of Fatah, The Palestinian Liberation Movement's dominant secular and nationalist faction, has also sponsored suicide attacks. Unlike Islamic groups, which generally disallow use of women, children, married men, or the elderly, Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades allow all to become martyrs (*shohada*). As the overwhelming majority of Palestinians express religious beliefs, these rewards also include direct access to paradise.

The Middle East and North Africa are home to several other groups that sponsor suicide terrorism: Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Islamic Group of Egypt (Gamaya Islamiya, IG), Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA), and the Marxist-Leninist Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK). The Islamic groups all have ties to Al-Qaida. The PKK ceased suicide operations in 1999, after its captured leader, Abdullah Ocalan, called for cessation (Turkey subsequently opted not to execute Ocalan). The PKK has not attacked foreign interests, as have the secular groups of Lebanon, Israel-Palestine, and Sri Lanka.

Since 9/11, a number of Islamic groups in Central and Southeast Asia now sponsor or give logistical support to martyr actions. These include Chechen militants (acting mainly against Russian targets), Pakistan's *Harkat Al-Mujahedin* (formerly *Harkat Al-Ansar*), Bangladesh's Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Singapore's *Jemaah Islamiyah* ("Islamic Community," JI), Malaysia's *Al-Ma'uanah* ("Brotherhood of Inner Power") and *Kumpulan Militan* (KMM), Indonesia's *Laskar Jihad* ("Army of Jihad") and *Majelis Mujahedin* ("Holy Warriors' Council," MMI), and the Philippines' Abu Sayyaf Group. All of these organizations have substantiated ties to Al-Qaida (S5).

Many of the regional groups have long-standing militant credentials. JI, KMM, and MMI trace their origins to *Darul Islam* (“House of Islam”), a revolutionary group that emerged in the 1940s to fight Dutch rule in Indonesia. EIJ, IG, and GIA have roots in pre-existing associations of the “Muslim Brotherhood” (*Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun*), a paramilitary religious organization founded in Egypt in 1928 with branches throughout North Africa and the Middle East (S6). Increasingly, Al-Qaida has been able to co-opt militant Islam’s locally deep historical foundations into a global network of fluid but pervasive ties (S7) that support the truly radical goal of supplanting Western dominance with a worldwide Islamic Caliphate.

Through the Taliban, Al-Qaida availed itself of Islamic state terrorism to repress or kill politico-religious nonconformists within its central sphere of influence. As with Iran’s similar, if somewhat less virulent, form of state terrorism, the symbolic focus of repression was on women’s status, where every appearance and activity outside the household must be strictly controlled lest the core bond of Moslem society—the family—come unglued. As have the Algerian GIA and Egyptian EIJ, Al-Qaida’s state terrorism has also ruthlessly sought to extirpate civic (nonreligious and voluntary) influences from the body politic while encouraging other aspects of secular (e.g., scientific and technical) reforms deemed useful for the battles to come. But it is in the offensive against infidels—Christians, Jews and the states that support them, particularly the USA and Israel—that Al-Qaida’s strategy and tactics are revolutionary. Unlike its regional allies, Al-Qaida does not consider its first and primary target to be the less-than-true believers within Islamic countries, but infidels without whose support heresy, blasphemy, apostasy, infidelity, atheism, and political and economic “enslavement” (S8) would presumably not even be conceivable.

Al Qaida’s declared aim in this offensive is to use spectacular, seemingly indiscriminate, displays of violent self-sacrifice to demoralize the enemy’s noncombatant population so as to sap popular support for the enemy’s will to resist the agenda of the organization sponsoring the attack. This agenda includes immediate evacuation of Western interests from countries with large Moslem populations and acceptance of an Islamic Caliphate over all Moslems (including in countries with Moslem minorities) (S9): “The Caliphate is the only and best solution to the predicaments and problems from which Muslims suffer today.... It will remedy economic underdevelopment which was bequeathed upon us as a political independence on an atheist East and infidel West.” (S10). Al-Qaida’s brand of suicide mass terrorism is a fairly novel form of psychological warfare, using its opponents’ strengths to its own advantage. An attack operates on the assumption that the more efficient and global the media, the more powerful and widespread its effects.

Radical Islamic Fundamentalism—An Oxymoron. Unlike people in Western Christian societies, Arabic, Ottoman, and Persian Moslem communities never entertained notions of a church different or separate from state or nation until Kemal Ataturk established the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Christians early on accepted a separation of church and state as a matter of cultural survival (“Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s.” *Matthew 22:21*). Once Christianity became the religion of empires and kingdoms, relations between church and state were

often conflicting and intermittently blurred. Nevertheless, these two distinct bodies of powers and functions endured through all of Western Christendom. Beginning with the Peace of Westphalia at the end of Europe's religious Thirty Years War, spurred along by the nonreligious American Revolution and the antireligious French Revolution, and culminating with the advent of the European Union after World War II, Western Europe and some former colonies finally opted for a full constitutional divorce between church and state (albeit with some apparent backsliding now occurring in the United States). This would hopefully forestall the hitherto relentless bloodshed among competing religious communities and allow for a constitutionally sanctioned degree of political and religious pluralism needed to sustain economic productivity, social peace, and individual welfare.

In contrast, the very idea of conflict or struggle between religious ministration, on the one hand, and political, economic, and social administration, on the other hand, was wholly alien to Moslem civilization ever since Mohammed successfully fused all these functions in the Nation of Islam. Like Judaism, but unlike Christianity, war-making powers have been scripturally invested with leaders of the religious community since ancient times (*S11*). Unlike Christianity before modern times, Islam tolerated other religions in its midst, particularly Christianity and Judaism, even allowing their adherents to reach the highest political offices under ultimate (sometimes merely titular) Moslem suzerainty. Only with the collapse of post-colonial Moslem regimes that were caricatures of Western secular ideologies (national militarism, communism, socialism, or constitutional monarchy), has the idea and policy emerged of religious believers seizing control of the state apparatus by repressing or annihilating nonconformists from within and blocking entry or killing infidels from without.

Contrary Academic Explanations. Scholarly explanations of the genesis of suicide terrorism have tended toward rather simplistic reductions to some essential cause or factor. Some of these elements have been more important than others, depending on time and place. All are also characteristic of phenomena other than suicide terrorism. None alone are sufficient to explain its genesis. Given the fact that its spread across minds and populations now depends critically on global media, calling for often immediate reactions, the phenomenon of suicide terrorism is almost guaranteed to “mutate” in structure, capability, and operation at a spiraling rate that may be approaching that of a biological or ideational retrovirus, such as AIDS or computer worms. Consider the following:

At first, when Hezbollah's connections to Iran were obvious, analysts sought to explain the genesis of suicide terrorism as a “state-sponsored” activity. Daniel Pipes, Director of the Middle East Forum and an advisor to the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, concluded that: “Governments, not individuals willing to die, make this a potent force. Without state support, suicide acts would be infrequent and ineffectual.” (*S12*). Individuals who participate in suicide attacks might themselves be victims of “blackmail” and “unwilling suicide.” Adequate defense would thus be straightforward: make unbearable the costs to states that sponsor terror.

According to the Federation of American Scientists, however, even Hezbollah “may have conducted operations that were not approved by Iran.” (*S13*). Although other

terrorist organizations have entered into relationships with governments, there is no evidence that such relationships were ever proprietary or exclusive; they have often been changing and volatile (e.g., relations of Lebanese and Palestinian groups with Syria, Iran, and Iraq). Moreover, all polls of populations supporting suicide attacks, and nearly all interrogations of captured suicide operatives, indicate that those who choose martyrdom do so as willing volunteers.

Many of the arguments used to demonstrate state sponsorship of suicide terrorism have since proved specious: the organization's shadowy nature (hence, a front for something more substantial), the careful planning involved (requiring sophisticated state-level intelligence services), the innovative use of personnel, explosives, and other weapons (requiring state-level financing and logistics), and so forth. Many of these same arguments are now used to demonstrate the contrary, namely, that shadowy, mobile, flexible, innovative organizations could not possibly be sponsored by top-heavy state bureaucracies. Some analysts even surmise that suicide terrorism thrives only in anarchy. For example, Shibley Telhami, Professor of Government at the University of Maryland and a Brookings Institute Fellow, states: "The absence of effective government is their primary source of power. They are antigovernment." (S14). Support for this view comes from the recent rise of a stateless, multinational Al-Qaida, concurrent with the disintegration of the Palestinian Authority and its ability to control new waves of suicide bombings. Nevertheless, governments have sponsored, aided, and abetted suicide terrorism in the past and will likely do so in the future.

Other scenarios locate the essence of suicide terrorism in the individual's irrational pathology or reasonable coping mechanisms. Much of the early research on terrorism, especially in the psychological literature, instructed that the causes of terrorism "must be sought in the psychopathology of the assassin." (S15). Popular media images of crazed, lone gunmen blowing their brains out after a killing spree encouraged public support for this approach. According to Israeli psychologist Ariel Merari: (S16) "Culture in general, and religion in particular, seem to be relatively unimportant in the phenomenon of terrorist suicide. Terrorist suicide, like any other suicide, is basically an individual rather than a group phenomenon: it is done by people who wish to die for personal reasons." (S17). For Rafi Israeli, a Professor at the Hebrew University's Truman Institute for Peace, suicide bombers are low-esteem sufferers who have emerged from broken families (S18).

Psychologist Andrew Silke, however, notes that it is rare to find hard evidence of a terrorist who suffers from personality disorders or who could be classified as mentally ill or psychologically deviant. Silke argues that becoming a terrorist is primarily a product of individual socialization. Socially disaffected persons become terrorists when they encounter a precipitating event, such as "extreme physical violence committed by the police or security forces or other rival group against the individual, friends or simply anyone they can identify with." (S19). In a similar vein, Palestinian psychiatrist Eyad Sarraj, Director of the Gaza Community Mental Health Program, holds that suicide terrorism stems from despair and trauma at being constantly humiliated and subject to violence (both by Israel and the Palestinian authority): "Do you know what it means for a child to see his father spat at and beaten before his eyes?" (S20)

The Role of Religion. For Merari, (S21) who has reversed his earlier position and now holds that suicide terrorism can only be properly fathomed at the organizational and not individual level, (S22) religion is only one of a number of possible organizational mechanisms for establishing a contract binding the individual to his group commitment. The example of nonreligious suicide bombers in Lebanon and Sri Lanka would seem to drive home the point. Nevertheless, it is possible to consider ostensibly nonreligious commitments to transhistorical ethno-nationalist agendas, personality cults, and axiomatic Marxist-Leninist principles as examples of (quasi-) religious belief defined as follows: (i) (materially) costly, and (ii) sincere (emotionally hard-to-fake) commitment to (iii) a preposterously counterfactual world (of supernatural or transcendent causes that are impossible to verify or falsify by logical or empirical means) (S23). The greater the material sacrifice (e.g., killing of self or a loved one) to an apparently absurd truth (instant violent death becoming an eternally pleasurable life in paradise, surviving one's death by making it a living part of ineluctable historical or national consciousness), the more one is able to convince oneself, and thus others, of the selfless truth of one's cause.

Because the worth of this commitment to a factually preposterous world cannot be empirically or logically validated, it is validated only through emotional communion with fellow believers in public ceremonies. This ceremonial communion always involves the affective coordination of body states among members of the congregation (through song, chant, incantation, dance, sway, marching, etc.). Even the Taliban and Al-Qaida promote ritual use of a cappella chants. Ritual communion often includes typical primate gestures of submission and trust (kneeling, bowing, prostrating, baring throat and chest, etc.) as well as courtship (routinized, formulaic patterning of ritual) and bonding (cooing, hugging, kissing, etc.) (S23).

In the case of Al Qaida and the Taliban, early religious indoctrination appears to be significant for proactive martyrdom. Prolonged humiliation and precipitating events are not evident factors. “*Jihad*” was often the first word children learn to spell in Taliban religious schools (*madrasa*). Taught as “God’s path to paradise,” the idea matures if need be into war unto death, as in the following Harakat (Pakistani-based Al-Qaida ally) Oath to Jihad (*bayt al-ridwan*): “I, Amir Maawia Siddiqi, son of Abdul Rahman Siddiqi, state in the presence of God that I will slaughter infidels my entire life.” (S10). Palestinian suicide terrorists become “living martyrs” the moment they reaffirm the *bayt al-ridwan* in video testaments of their willingness to die so long as enemies live (S24).

Such sentiments are characteristic of apparently arational, emotionally driven commitments, including heartfelt romantic love and uncontrollable vengeance (S25). They may have emerged under natural selection’s influence, to override rational calculations based on seemingly impossible or very long odds of achieving individual goals, such as lasting security (S26). Although these sentiments seem to lack rationality in the short term (i.e., in the rational-choice sense of maximizing known or anticipated utility), they may be eminently rational as evolutionary strategies that refine the reward mechanism for pursuing individual self-interest by enhancing long-term benefits for members of a population *on average*. Provided that actual instances of self-sacrifice are relatively rare, yet frequent enough to convince people of their sincerity and efficacy, they may benefit many or most individuals in a population much of the time.

In the case of religiously inspired suicide terrorism, however, these sentiments are manipulated by organizational leaders, recruiters, and trainers to the advantage of the institution (particularly institutional elites), not the individual. In much the same way, the pornography, fast food, or soft drink industries manipulate evolved proclivities for naturally scarce commodities like sexual mates, fatty foods, and sugar to ends that reduce personal fitness but benefit the manipulating institution. In the present case, such manipulation is an extreme form of a common practice, in which society's ruling management demands readiness-to-die from its own members—and occasional execution of this demand—as a demonstration of faith in society. In times of crisis, every society routinely calls upon some of its own people to forfeit their own particular bodies for the general good of the body-politic. Still, these more common calls to sacrifice usually allow a glimmer of hope for survival. The psychological distance between willing acceptance of certain loss of life and possible escape—however unlikely—is the ultimate measure of devotion that religions typically uphold as ideal (S27).

In sum, both psychosocial (small cells organized under charismatic leadership) and socio-ecological (unattached males in supportive religious and peer groups) factors shape the causal network of interconnected representations, emotions, and behaviors that are broadly characteristic of contemporary suicide bombing. Individual psychopathology, lack of education, and poverty as such seem not to be significant determining factors, whereas religious and political context may be decisive. Institutionalized creation of intimate social cells of willing believers works to canalize ideas (as might a school) and emotions (as might a church) into proximate causes of actions that lead to attack forms of martyrdom. One's performance in the network of religious and cultural behaviors often has a complex causal determination that involves any number of variously interrelated personal and social selection factors (S28). These pertain to the internal environment of individual ideas and emotions, as well as to external conditions of social and physical context.

References and Notes
S1. B. Lewis, *The Assassins* (Basic, New York, 2002).

S2. K. Andriolo, *Am. Anthropol.* **104**, 736 (2002).

S3. A. Waldman, *New York Times*, 14 January 2003, p. A1. “Black Tigers underwent intense physical and psychological training and reportedly a last dinner with Mr. Prabhakaran.”

S4. Israeli intelligence initially supported the expansion of militant Islamic groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, to counter Arafat’s Fatah and the PLO. These groups became pillars of Hamas and PIJ. As the “brothers” (*ikhwan*) explained to this author in the 1970s and 1980s, only persons whose parents were born in Israel-Palestine could remain after the Zionist entity was destroyed. All others would leave, by force if necessary. Those remaining would be incorporated into a version of the traditional *millet* system, wherein tolerated non-Moslem religious communities (*dhimmi*), such as Christians and Jews, would be granted inferior social and political status in exchange for being allowed to live among Moslems.

S5. “White Paper—The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests,” Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs (Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore, 9 January 2003); available at www2.mha.gov.sg.

S6. The Brotherhood arose in response to the Ottoman Caliphate’s collapse. It consisted of nationwide cells that might ultimately be brought together into an army to expel foreign influence from Egypt and eventually the whole Moslem world. During the First Arab-Israeli War (1948–1949), Egyptian authorities disbanded the Brotherhood, sent thousands of members to detention camps, and probably murdered its founder, Hassan Al-Banna. It was dissolved again in 1954 after a failed attempt to assassinate Egyptian leader Gamal Nasser. It has persisted as an association of militant, clandestine groups that reject Western values and seek to live by the Quran’s original precepts. The Brotherhood has claimed responsibility for political violence in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Palestine and Sudan. After disavowing violence in the 1980s, it was permitted to operate openly in Egypt. A wave of religiously inspired assassinations of foreign tourists compelled the government to move against the group in the mid and late 1990s.

S7. On the day (27 December 2002) of a suicide attack on a West Bank Jewish Seminary (jointly claimed by Hamas and PIJ) and the suicide bombing of government headquarters in Chechnya, French authorities broke up a four-man cell (plotting to destroy the Russian embassy) with direct links to Chechen militants, GIA and Al-Qaida. Possibly spurred by strengthened contacts with Al-Qaida, Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah has recently urged Palestinian allies, PIJ and Hamas, “to take suicide bombings worldwide.” P. Martin, *Washington Times*, 4 December 2002.

S8. Slavery—an institution sanctioned in Moslem Holy Law, or *Sharī’a*—was finally outlawed by Saudia Arabia and Yemen in 1962. *De facto* slavery, especially at the household level, is still not uncommon. Traditionally, Moslems had a right to enslave infidels. They also had a lawful duty to provide adequate nourishment and lodging for slaves and to treat them humanely, unlike the case with the much harsher forms of European and American slavery. *De facto* (economic, social, political) “enslavement” to infidel (e.g., American) and atheist (e.g., Russian) interests is the ultimate humiliation of an Islamic Nation that for centuries appeared to successfully carry out Allah’s program to conquer the world through the joint force of ideas and arms.

- S9. U.S. Department of Justice, *Al Qaeda Training Manual*, online release 7 December 2001; ; available at www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm.
- S10. D Rhode, A. Chivers, *New York Times*, 17 March 2002, p. A1.
- S11. Papal authorities frequently used indirect scriptural support to co-opt such powers, whereas Judaism's minority status for the last two millennia precluded its rabbinical authorities (with marginal exceptions) from attempting to implement offensive war on Biblical terms.
- S12. D. Pipes, *Natl Interest* (No. 4), 95 (1986).
- S13. "Hizballah," Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Intelligence Resource Program Rep. (21 May 2002); available at www.fas.org/irp/world/para/hizballah.htm.
- S14. S. Telhami, *New York Times* (4 April 2002), p. A23.
- S15. A. Kaplan, in Y. Alexander, J. Gleason, *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism* (Pergamon, New York, 1981), p. 36.
- S16. A. Merari, in W. Reich, *Origins of Terrorism* (Cambridge Univ. Press, New York, 1990), p. 206.
- S17. Interpretation bias in terms of exclusively personal factors, or "fundamental attribution error," seems especially prevalent in "individualistic" cultures (e.g., USA, Western Europe). In contrast, cultures (in Africa and Asia) in which a "collectivist" ethic appears more prevalent show less susceptibility to such judgments. Thus, experiments compared how Americans and Chinese interpreted murders, as when a recently fired postal worker stormed a post office killing several people inside then himself. As predicted, Americans (university students and journalists) attributed the murders more to personality factors ("bad temper," "psychologically disturbed"), whereas the Chinese (students and reporters) attributed more to situational factors ("victim of policy," "isolation from the community"). M. Morris, R. Nisbett, K. Ping, in *Causal Cognition*, D. Sperber, D. Premack, A. Premack, Eds. (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1995), pp. 577-612.
- S18. R. Israeli, *Terrorism Polit. Violence* **9**, 96 (1997).
- S19. A. Silke, *Psychologist* **14**, 580 (2001).
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- S21. A. Merari, *Harvard Int. Rev.* **23** (2002); available at www.hir.harvard.edu/back/article.php3?art_id=merari2234.
- S22. E. Sprinzak, *Foreign Pol.* (September/October), 66 (2000); available at www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_SeptOct_2001/sprinzak.html.
- S23. S. Atran, *In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion* (Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 2002).
- S24. The *bayt al-ridwan* refers to the garden in paradise where the Prophet and martyrs reside. Reaffirmation of this Jihad oath emphasizes the free and joyful path of sacrifice, along which green birds will carry the martyr against a purple sky to the loving care of 72 young virgins. N. Hassan, *New Yorker* (19 November 2001); available at www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?011119fa_FACT1.
- S25. R. Frank, *Passions Within Reason* (Norton, New York, 1988).
- S26. R. Nesse, *Science Spirit* **10**, 32 (1999).
- S27. Unlike people willing to blow themselves up, for frontline soldiers in an apparently hopeless battle there usually remains hope for survival. G. Allport, J. Gillespie, J. Young, *J. Psychol.* **25**, 3 (1948). The distance between no hope and some

(however small) is infinite. While commitment to die for nonkin cannot be rendered within standard theories of Expected Utility, there are moves theorists attempt, such as invoking “infinite utility.” Using “infinite utility” to patch theories of rationality creates holes elsewhere in the system. Thus, expected utilities are usually weighted averages, which has scant sense when one term is infinite. The deeper point is that notions of maximization of anticipated benefits cannot account for such behaviors, and ad hoc moves to maintain rationality utility at all costs results in a concept of rationality or utility doing little explanatory work. In sum, reliance on rational-choice theories may not be the best way to understand and try to stop suicide terrorism.

S28. S. Atran, *Hum. Nat.* **12**, 351 (2001).